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ABSTRACT 
 
THE WEB-BASED APPLICATION OF  
KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS FOR DIGITAL AND MOBILE 
SIGNATURES 
 
Many people want to communicate and send their data securely, for this reason they 
use encryption methods. Symmetric cryptosystems are commonly used for securing data. 
They are fast and reliable. But there is a problem of exchanging keys in symmetric 
cryptosystems. Sender and receiver must share keys to get the plain text. In this thesis, 
different scenarios for key exchange protocols are developed. Solutions for securing 
communication to block man in the middle attack are also defined in this thesis. 
 v
ÖZET 
 
SAYISAL VE MOBİL İMZA İÇİN ANAHTAR DEĞİŞİMİ 
 PROTOKOLLERİNİN WEB TABANLI UYGULAMASI 
 
Birçok kişi iletişimde ve veri transferinde güvende olmayı ister, bu yüzden şifreleme 
metotlarına başvururlar. Simetrik kriptosistemler veri güvenliğinde sık kullanılan bir 
yöntemdir. Hızlı ve güvenilirdirler. Fakat simetrik kriptosistemlerde anahtar değişimi 
problemi baş gösterir. Gönderen ve alıcıda aynı anahtarın bulunması zorunludur. Bu tez ile 
anahtar değişim protokolleri için değişik senaryolar üretilmiştir. Ayrıca transfer sırasında 
gelebilecek saldırılara karşı nasıl önlemler alındığı da açıklanmıştır.  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter some background information is provided. The key exchange protocols 
which utilized in all of the scenarios of this thesis are mentioned in this chapter. All these 
protocols have been implemented in Crympix cryptographic library by earlier researchers 
(Hışıl 2005 , Uslu 2007). The software created for this thesis connects to Crympix in order to 
to generate the necessary parameters for each scenario. The digital signature algorithms are 
implemented and used for authorization of users 
1.1. Key Exchange 
 
People want to secure their communications and data transfers. For this reason, they 
want to encrypt their data through a cryptographic system. One of these cryptographic 
systems is called as Symmetrical Cryptosystem. Symmetrical cryptosystems utilize same key 
for the purposes of both encryption and decryption process and in doing so it is required that 
the both sides of the communicating parties must have the same key obtained prior to the 
communication event take place.  
Having same the key obtained thus explained above for both sides is a problem since 
the key must either be shared in advance and/or be distributed securely thru the secure 
channels which might be expensive to get and even more expensive to maintain. Therefore, 
the communicating parties need a protocol for exchanging the keys. These protocols are 
commonly known as the Key Exchange Protocols. 
1.2. Key Exchange Protocols 
 
As aforementioned, the whole idea about the key exchange protocol is get the key 
distributed to the only communicating parties of the communication. Now, this key is usually 
called the session key which means that key is active during the communication and another 
key will be generated for a new communication since the session key will be destroyed upon 
the termination of the communication. Key exchange protocols utilize mathematical 
approaches in order to obtain the session keys for both sides without transferring it. So that 
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nobody can get the session key by listening into the data transfer channel in between two 
sides other than the legitimate parties. 
Even if we are using a symmetrical cryptosystem we still have to utilize the public and 
private key pairs in key exchange protocols for they are not used for cryptographical purposes 
but used for calculating the session key.  
 Key pairs are generated from specific domain parameters in both sides. These domain 
parameters and public keys are not secret. Only the private keys of both sides are secret. 
However, regenerating private key from domain parameters and public keys must be so 
difficult due to the utilization of mathematical protocols. 
 Three key exchange protocols explained briefly in this chapter, both protocols have 
domain parameters for generating public-private key pairs. Although all protocols look the 
same in the structure, their mathematical background is very different. 
1.2.1. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
 
Difficulty of calculating discrete logarithms in finite fields is the main starting point of 
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Algorithm.  
Discrete logarithm can be explained in formal definition as: 
“Let G is a finite cyclic group of order n. Let α  be a generator of G, and let β ∈G. 
The discrete logarithm of β  to the baseα , which is denoted as logα β , is the unique integer 
x, 0≤  x ≤  n-1, such that β  = α x (Menezes et al. 1996).”  
Also discrete logarithm problem can be explained as: 
 “Given a prime p, a generator α  of Z p* and an elementβ ∈  Z p*, find the integer x, 
0≤  x ≤  p-2, such that α x ≡ β (mod p) (Menezes et al. 1996).” 
Discrete logarithm function is not soluble in polynomial time. This means that this 
function is an NP complete problem. Functions which are NP complete are suitable for use in 
cryptographic protocols. 
Diffie Hellman Key Exchange Algorithm has three domain parameters (ANSI X9.42 
1998): 
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• p: A prime defining the Galois Field GF(p), which is used as a modulus in the 
operations of GF(p), where 2(L-1)< p < 2L , for L ≥ 1024, and L is a multiple of 256. 
• q: A prime factor of p-1 such that p = jq+1 and q > 2m-1. GF(p)* has a cyclic subgroup 
of order q. 
• g: A generator of the q-order cyclic subgroup of GF(p)*, that is, an element of order q 
in the multiplicative group of GF(p). 
The key pair includes: 
• Ax : A private key which is selected as 1 ≤  x ≤  (q-1). 
• Ay : A public key which is calculated as (mod )A
xAy g p= . 
The shared key is calculated as: 
.( ) (mod ) ( ) (mod ) (mod )B A B A A B
x x xx xK y p g p g p= = =  
.( ) (mod ) ( ) (mod ) (mod )A B A B A B
x xx x xK y p g p g p= = =  
 
1.2.2. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
 
Elliptic curve cryptographical algorithms and protocols are used in Elliptic Curve 
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Algorithm. 
The characteristics of elliptic curves, such as being defined on a finite cyclic group, 
and having operations as addition and doubling for the points on the elliptic curve makes 
these curves suitable for cryptographic protocols. Because when a scalar multiplication, which 
is actually a point addition, of an integer number (n) and a point (P) on curve is performed, 
even if the start and stop points and all other parameters about curve are known, it is hard to 
find the integer n (Uslu 2007). 
The domain parameters used in Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Key Exchange are listed 
below (ANSI X9.63 1999): 
• p:  A prime defining order of the finite field F q , where q = p and p > 3 
• a, b:  Two field elements in F p which define the equation of the elliptic curve  
(1.1) 
(1.2) 
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2 3: (mod  )E y x ax b p= + +                                                                  
• ,G Gx y :  Two field elements in F p which define a point ( , )G GG x y of prime order on E 
( note that E ≠  ∞  ) 
• n: The order of the point G 
• h: The cofactor defined as # ( ) /ph E F n=   
The key pair includes: 
• Ax :  A private key which is selected in the interval [1, n-1]. 
• AQ : A public key which is a point ( , )Q QQ x y  on elliptic curve and calculated using 
point multiplication .AQ x G=  
The shared key is calculated as: 
. . .A B A BK x Q x x G= =  by User A 
. . .B A A BK x Q x x G= =  by User B 
 
1.2.3. Elliptic Curve MQV Key Exchange 
 
Actually, the man in the middle attack is the main problem for key exchange 
algorithms and, MQV has been developed against these attacks (Law, et al. 1998). 
The fundamental distinction between MQV and other key exchange protocols is that 
MQV uses two different key pairs. One of these key pairs is called static or long-term key pair 
which is bound to the entity for a certain period of time, typically through the use of 
certificates. The other key pair is called ephemeral or short-term key pair which is generated 
for each run of the protocol (Law, et al. 1998). 
The domain parameters are (ANSI X9.63 1999): 
• p:  A prime defining the order of the finite field F p , where p > 3 
• a, b: Two field elements in F p which define the equation constants of the elliptic 
curve  
2 3: (mod  )E y x ax b p= + +                                                                  
(1.3) 
(1.4) 
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• ,G Gx y : Two field elements in F p which define a point ( , )G GG x y  of prime order on E  
• n: The order of the points over E in F p ; # ( )pE F n=  
• h: The cofactor defined as # ( ) /ph E F n=   
These parameters are specified by assuming that the elliptic curve E is defined on a 
finite field that has odd characteristic ( F p). 
• The static (or long-term) key pair includes: 
•  Aw  : A static private key.  
• AW : A static public key.  
The ephemeral (or short-term) key pair includes: 
• Ar : An ephemeral private key which is selected as a statistically unique and 
unpredictable (random) integer in the interval [1, n-1].  
• AR : An ephemeral public key which is a point ( , )R RR x y  on elliptic curve and 
calculated using point multiplication .A AR r G=  
The implicit signature is symbolized as As  (or Bs ) and calculated as (Uslu 2007): 
( . ) mod    A A A As r R w n= + by User A  
( . ) mod    B B B Bs r R w n= + by User B 
Then the shared key is calculated as (Uslu 2007):  
. .( . )
.(( . ) mod ).( . )
.((( . ) mod ). (( . ) mod ). . )
.( . . . . . . . . )
.( .( . ) . .( . ) . .( . ) . . .( . ))
. .( .
A B B B
A A A B B B
A A A B A A A B B
A B A A B A B B A A B B
A B A A B A B B A A B B
A
K h s R R W
h r R w n R R W
h r R w n R r R w n R W
h r R R w R r R W R w R W
h r r G R w r G r R w G R w R w G
h G r r
= +
= + +
= + + +
= + + +
= + + +
= . . . . . . . )             by User A  B B A A A B B A B A Br w R r w R w w R R+ + +
 
(1.5) 
(1.6) 
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. .( . )
.(( . ) mod ).( . )
.((( . ) mod ). (( . ) mod ). . )
.( . . . . . . . . )
.( .( . ) . .( . ) . .( . ) . . .( . ))
. .( .
B A A A
B B B A A A
B B B A B B B A A
B A B B A B A A B B A A
B A B B A B A A B B A A
A
K h s R R W
h r R w n R R W
h r R w n R r R w n R W
h r R R w R r R W R w R W
h r r G R w r G r R w G R w R w G
h G r r
= +
= + +
= + + +
= + + +
= + + +
= . . . . . . . )             by User B  B A B B B A A A B A Br w R r w R w w R R+ + +
 
 
1.3. Digital and Mobile Signatures 
 
For an agreement upon a document, a handwritten signature has been utilized as proof 
of authorship for a long time. Since a handwritten signature is authentic, unforgeable, not 
reusable, unalterable, and supposed to be nonrepudiated it is therefore quite convenient 
theoretically. However, many methods are generated to break these supposedly unique 
characteristics. For instance, in today’s computer world it would be very easy to cut and paste 
a valid graphical signature from one document just to copy to another one. 
 
Trents are used for verifying signatures of users. Every one must communicate with a 
Trent to verify the signature of the other one they are talking to. Every user has two keys one 
shared and one secret. Shared keys are stored in a Trent called Certification Authority. If one 
user wants to send data to another, he/she then signs data with secret key and only his/her 
shared key can open that signatures so that the receiver gets sender’s shared key from 
certification authority and verifies the signatures (Schneier 1996). 
 
1.4. Crympix 
 
CRYMPIX is a multiprecision cryptographic library which was designed and developed 
by Hüseyin Hışıl as a master degree thesis “A Distributed Multiprecision Cryptographic 
Library Design” (Hışıl 2005). 
As a multiprecision library CRYMPIX uses large numbers for cryptographic 
applications by splitting them to small pieces called word. Words have a length of n for an n-
bit processor. 
(1.7) 
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Figure 1.1. Architecture of CRYMPIX 
 
Portability is very important for a cryptographic library so CRYMPIX is developed in 
ANSI C platform which is suitable for different platforms. Also, word lengths can be changed 
for different processor types. 
CRYMPIX has many structures for multiprecision integers, finite fields, prime numbers 
and elliptic curves. So, many mathematical forms can be implemented in CRYMPIX easily. 
CRYMPIX divided into several layers shown in Figure 1.1. Basic arithmetic operations, 
such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, exponentiation, modulus and modular 
exponentiation, are implemented in the multiprecision layer. Input-output operations and 
some base functions are placed in the kernel layer. Finite layer implements the finite field 
mathematical forms and operations. The cryptographic protocols such as encryption-
decryption algorithms are placed in cryptography layer (Uslu 2007) 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
SCENARIOS 
 
Two scenarios are explained in this chapter. The first one is for communication of two 
users directly without any other computerized media between. In addition, the second one is 
for a communication through a server. 
2.1. Key Exchange Without Server 
 
In this scenario two people are communicating with each other directly, so that they 
must generate parameters and they must calculate a session key by themselves. For this reason, 
the hardware is important for the run-time performance of the application. 
First of all the person who wants to communicate with the other has to determine 
which Key Exchange Protocol to use. Also he/she must determine which user will generate 
domain parameters. All communication for getting a session key is shown in Figure 2.1, and 
the communication steps are as follows 
Step 1: User A prepare communication request. 
Step 2: User A sends communication request message to User B. 
Step 3: User B accepts communication request. 
Step 4: User A generates domain parameters and Public, Private Key pairs. 
Step 5: User A sends required domain parameters and Public Key to User B. 
Step 6: User B takes domain parameters and generates own public, private key pair. 
Step 7: User B calculates session key. 
Step 8: User B sends own public key to User A. 
Step 9: User A calculates session key. 
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Figure 2.1. Key exchange without server 
 
This scenario provides the users with an opportunity to generate domain parameters 
in their device or in remote user’s device. This is useful when you have a device with limited 
configuration like pocket PCs and/or PDAs. For instance, a pocket pc wants to communicate 
with a laptop having a dual core processor; and since the laptop is more powerful than pocket 
pc, the pocket pc may select the option, as remote machine will generate domain parameters. 
In Figure 2.2, one can see the options for generation of the parameters and choices 
of the protocols.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Choosing protocols and generating parameters 
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Although users have a chance for generating domain parameters in remote user, all 
users must generate private and public key pairs. So each device must at least generate key 
pairs. But this option gives a chance to decrease generation time for the devices which have 
limited hardware. 
2.2. Key Exchange With Server 
 
Generating domain parameters is a time consuming operation. Moreover, this time 
gets to be changed due to the hardware configurations of the client machines. In all key 
exchange protocols domain parameters are public so that they can be generated by a powerful 
server. 
However, clients because of secrecy must do generating private and public keys. 
This means that in order to make private key secretly the clients must generate it themselves. 
Like a formerly mentioned scenario, one client has to determine which Key Exchange 
Protocol will be used in this scenario too and, the necessary domain parameters are taken 
from server as well. 
All communication for getting a session key is shown in Figure 2.3; and the 
communication steps are as follows: 
Step 1: User A prepare communication request. 
Step 2: User A sends communication request message to User B. 
Step 3: User B accepts communication request. 
Step 4: User A requests necessary domain parameters from server 
Step 5: User A generates Public, Private Key pairs. 
Step 6: User A sends required domain parameters and Public Key to User B. 
Step 7: User B takes domain parameters and generates own public, private key pair. 
Step 8: User B calculates session key. 
Step 9: User B sends own public key to User A. 
Step 10: User A calculates session key. 
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Figure 2.3. Key exchange with server 
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This scenario aims to decrease the load of the client devices. Mobile client devices 
have limited capacity so that every operation done by server is important for them. We have a 
chance to generate public and private keys and generation of session key in server. Therefore, 
the client device only transfers data to server. Nevertheless, in that scenario, every operation 
is done in server and if there are many clients, there may be a denial of service due to a very 
heavy load. In addition, another important point is that if somebody listens the transmission as 
a men_in_the_middle_attack, he/she can get domain parameters, private and public keys and 
session key. 
 Another disadvantage is that, all parameters are taken to the server and if somebody 
can reach server he/she can obtain all data about the session key. 
 Hence we only generate domain parameters, which are not secret in key exchange 
protocol, by server. Therefore, clients must generate public and private key pairs as well as 
session keys. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
AUTHENTICATION 
 
Authentication is very important in key exchange scenarios, because one has to be sure 
that sender of the data is really the person who is to be communicated with. In these scenarios, 
the man in the middle attack is the most dangerous attack.  
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the man in the middle attack for key exchange scenarios. In 
this attack scenario, a person who wants to obtain the session key is located in the middle of 
the transfer. This person (the Man in the Middle) is able to obtain all the messages from both 
User A and User B, and sends her own fabricated messages instead of the original messages. 
To do this, the attacker generates one session key for User A and another for User B, and 
intercepts all the messages from both users while being in the middle of the transmission. The 
communication steps in Figure 3.1 are outlined as follows. 
Step 1: User A prepares the communication request. 
Step 2: User A sends the communication request message to User B. 
Step 3: Man in the Middle intercepts the message 
Step 4: Man in the Middle sends new communication request to User B. 
 User B thinks that the request comes from User A. 
Step 5: Man in the Middle accepts the communication request of User A. 
 User A thinks that the acceptance comes from user B.  
Step 6: User B accepts the communication request, and Man in the Middle catches it. 
Step 7: User A generates the domain parameters and the public-private key pairs. 
Step 8: User A sends the required domain parameters and the public key to User B. 
Step 9: Man in the Middle intercepts the domain parameters and generates the 
public-private key pair. 
Step 10: Man in the Middle computes the session key for the communication with  
User A. 
Step 11: Man in the Middle sends the generated public key to User A. 
 User A thinks that the key belongs to User B 
Step 12: User A calculates the session key. 
Step 13:  Man in the Middle generates new domain parameters for User B. 
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Figure 3.1. Man in the middle attack on key exchange 
 
Step 14: Man in The Middle sends the domain parameters to User B. 
  User B thinks this that the data come from User A. 
Step 15: User B receives the domain parameters and generates public-private key  
pair. 
Step 16: User B computes the session key. 
Step 17: User B sends the public key to User A. 
Step 18: Man in the Middle intercepts the message and generates the session key for 
the communication with User B. 
 
 As mentioned above, the man in the middle is a very dangerous attack, because User 
A and User B have different session keys and they never really communicate with each other 
throughout the whole scheme. In addition, the man in the middle can recover all the messages 
encrypted with the session keys. Also, users can not decrypt each other’s messages without 
the man in the middle due to the fact that their session keys are different.  
 In this attack, the man in the middle recovers each message from each user by 
decrypting with this user’s session key. After the decryption, the man in the middle can either 
 15
modify the message or only reads it. Later, the message is sent to the other user after being 
encrypted with the proper session key. 
 It is very critical to avoid from or determine the occurrence of this type of attacks. For 
this reason, the certification method is used to prevent the man in the middle attacks. 
 While using the certification, each user has her own certificate and knows that the 
message is coming from the user who claims to be the sender, because only the owner of the 
certificate is able to sign the message. 
 There are two different ways of using certification. One of them is to use Internal 
Business Server and the other is the presence of External Certification Authority (CA).  
3.1. With Internal Business Server 
 
This method is mainly used in business solutions. If a company chooses this option, 
the company has to store the user public keys. This means that company has to make a secure 
service to respond to the certification confirmation requests, and provide the required physical, 
software and hardware based security. In other words, this company should achieve the 
standards of a Certification Authority. 
The Key Exchange with Server communication scenario is subject to change when 
Authentication is existent. In Figure 3.2, the Key Exchange with Server scenario with 
Authentication on internal server is provided. The communication steps are as follows. 
Step 1: User A prepares the communication request including its own certificate. 
Step 2: User A sends the communication request message to User B. 
Step 3: User B checks User A’s certificate from the CA of the internal server. 
Step 4: User B accepts the communication request including its own certificate. 
Step 5: User A checks User B’s certificate from the CA of the internal server. 
Step 6: User A requests the necessary domain parameters from server including its 
own certificate. 
Step 7: Server checks User A’s certificate from internal CA. 
Step 8: Server sends the necessary parameters to User A including its own certificate. 
Step 9: User A checks Servers certificate from internal server CA. 
Step 10:  User A generates Public-Private Key pairs.  
Step 11: User A sends the required domain parameters and the Public Key to User B 
including its own certificate. 
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Figure 3.2. Authentication with internal server 
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Step 12: User B checks User A’s certificate from the CA of the internal server. 
Step 13: User B takes the domain parameters and generates own public-private key 
pair. 
Step 14: User B computes the session key. 
Step 15: User B sends its own public key to User A including its own certificate. 
Step 16: User A checks User B’s certificate from the CA of the internal server. 
Step 17: User A computes the session key.  
 
The above authenticated scenario provides the company with no need of any external 
CA. However, it is expensive and difficult to build and run a key management system inside 
the company. Therefore, many companies prefer external certification authorities. 
 Using the authentication mechanism, man in the middle attack is blocked because only 
the owner of the certificate is able to sign the message. The important points to consider are 
the security of the internal CA server and the user devices. If the attacker breaks in the server 
and modifies the certificates, the whole scheme fails. Furthermore, if the attacker manages to 
breach the client device and obtain the certificate or utilize the device without permission, the 
whole scheme fails again. 
In order to decrease the transmission time, an option is to store the user certificates 
during the transmission, so that users do not have to validate the certificates with the internal 
CA every time. 
When session keys are generated, all the stored certificates are removed. Using this 
mechanism, four steps can be omitted for this scenario and devices do not have to wait for the 
server response, so they can perform faster. In addition, server does not answer many requests 
because only two certification check requests arrives for any key exchange protocol, and this 
causes server load to decrease. 
Moreover, at the time of installation, it is possible to store server certificate inside the 
user devices so that the users do not have to check server certificate for every communication. 
In Figure 3.3, the Authenticated Key Exchange with Server scenario for only one time 
certificate control on internal server is outlined. The related communication steps are given 
below. 
Step 1: User A prepares the communication request including its own certificate. 
Step 2: User A sends the communication request message to User B. 
Step 3: User B checks User A’s certificate from the CA of the internal server and 
saves the certificate. 
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Figure 3.3. Authentication with internal server by stored certificates 
 
Step 4: User B accepts the communication request including its own certificate. 
Step 5: User A checks User B’s certificate from the CA of the internal server and 
saves the certificate. 
Step 6: User A requests the necessary domain parameters from server including its 
own certificate 
Step 7: Server checks User A’s certificate from internal CA. 
Step 8: Server sends the necessary parameters to User A including its own certificate. 
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Step 9: User A checks the server certificate from the stored certificate. 
Step 10: User A generates the Public-Private Key pairs. 
Step 11: User A sends the required domain parameters and the Public Key to User B 
including its own certificate. 
Step 12: User B checks User A’s certificate from the stored certificate. 
Step 13: User B takes domain parameters and generates its own public-private key 
pair. 
Step 14: User B computes the session key. 
Step 15: User B sends the public key to User A including its own certificate. 
Step 16: User A checks User B’s certificate from the stored certificate. 
Step 17: User A computes the session key. 
3.2.  With External Certification Authority 
3.2.1.  Key Exchange Without Server Scenario 
 
This scenario is designed primarily for two parties who want to communicate in secret 
or who have limited server support but strive to overcome the man in the middle attack. In 
this scheme everything is performed on the client side meaning that all generation, calculation 
and signing operations are executed in client devices. For this reason, the process might be 
slower if the client devices are not powerful enough. The related communication steps are 
described as follows and depicted in Figure 3.4. 
 
Step 1: User A prepares the communication request. 
Step 2: User A sends the communication request message to User B including its 
own certificate 
Step 3: User B checks User A’s certificate from the external CA. 
Step 4: User B accepts the communication request including its own certificate. 
Step 5: User A checks User B’s certificate from the external CA.  
Step 6: User A generates the domain parameters and Public-Private Key pairs. 
Step 7: User A sends the required domain parameters and the Public Key to User B 
including its own certificate. 
Step 8: User B checks User A’s certificate from the external CA.  
 20
 
 
Figure 3.4. Authentication from CA without server 
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Step 9: User B takes the domain parameters and generates the public-private key 
pair. 
Step 10: User B computes the session key. 
Step 11: User B sends its public key to User A including its own certificate. 
Step 12: User A checks User B’s certificate from the external CA.  
Step 13: User A computes session key. 
  
 Since certification is used throughout the whole transmission, the man in the middle 
attack is prevented. Users deny all packets with invalid certifications and close the 
communication. As a result, they can be sure that the packets come from the user with whom 
the communication is intended to be established. 
 Another important point is that the users check the certificates from external CA 
during the transmission and this is a time consuming process. If user devices are mobile and 
the users are charged for each data packet, the operation becomes quite expensive. 
 Like Authentication with Internal Business Server scenario, users can store certificate 
of the other user at the time of the first certificate check of the CA. Then, during every 
transmission the certificate is checked from the stored one. Therefore, for the whole 
communication the certificate is checked only once. It is important that the certificate is 
deleted from the stored address when the communication ends.  
 Users only check the certificate from the CA when stored certificate is different than 
the signed data which is sent by the remote user. This means that the remote user has changed 
her certificate during the communication. If the signed data is still different, there is either a 
man in the middle attack or some corruption occurs during the transmission of the message. 
Figure 3.5 portrays the Authenticated Key Exchange without Server scenario for only 
one time certificate control on internal server, whose communication steps are given below. 
Step 1: User A prepares the communication request. 
Step 2: User A sends the communication request message to User B including its 
own certificate 
Step 3: User B checks User A’s certificate from the external CA and saves the 
certificate. 
Step 4: User B accepts the communication request including its own certificate. 
Step 5: User A checks User B’s certificate from the external CA and saves the 
certificate. 
Step 6: User A generates the domain parameters and the Public-Private Key pairs. 
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Figure 3.5. Authentication from CA without server by stored certificates 
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Step 7: User A sends required the domain parameters and the Public Key to User B 
including its own certificate. 
Step 8: User B checks User A’s certificate from the stored certificate.  
Step 9: User B takes the domain parameters and generates the public-private key 
pair. 
Step 10: User B computes session key. 
Step 11: User B sends its public key to User A including its own certificate. 
Step 12: User A checks User B’s certificate from the stored certificate.  
Step 13: User A computes the session key. 
3.2.2. Key Exchange With Server Scenario 
 
Building a certification authority mechanism is quite expensive and a time consuming 
operation. For this reason, companies mainly prefer to buy this service from an external CA. 
However, they also have many servers working inside the company. Therefore, they want to 
perform some of the hard and time consuming calculations on these servers. 
At this point, the Key Exchange with Server scenario is extended by the usage of 
certification mechanism from External CA. In every operation, certificates are checked from 
the External CA. Although, this is a little bit time consuming operation, in order to make 
communication more secure, it should be performed. The communication steps are listed 
below and, the related scenario is depicted as Figure 3.6. 
 
Step 1: User A prepares the communication request including its own certificate. 
Step 2: User A sends the communication request message to User B. 
Step 3: User B checks User A’s certificate from the External CA. 
Step 4: User B accepts the communication request including its own certificate. 
Step 5: User A checks User B’s certificate from the External CA. 
Step 6: User A requests the necessary domain parameters from server including its 
own certificate 
Step 7: Server checks User A’s certificate from External CA. 
Step 8: Server sends the necessary parameters to User A including its own certificate. 
Step 9: User A checks Server certificate from External CA. 
Step 10:  User A generates the Public-Private Key pairs. 
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Figure 3.6. Authentication from CA with Internal Server 
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Step 11: User A sends the required domain parameters and Public Key to User B 
including its own certificate. 
Step 12: User B checks User A’s certificate from the External CA. 
Step 13: User B takes the domain parameters and generates the public-private key 
pair.  
Step 14: User B computes the session key. 
Step 15: User B sends its public key to User A including its own certificate. 
Step 16: User A checks User B’s certificate from the External CA. 
Step 17: User A computes the session key. 
 
Again, the users might store the certificates of the others in the first check from the 
CA and check the certificate from the stored one for every transmission. After the 
communication ends, certificates must be deleted from the stored address.  
Also, like internal server scenario, server certificate can be stored inside the devices so 
that client devices can perform the server checks faster. 
Figure 3.7 shows the Authenticated Key Exchange without Server scenario for only 
one time certificate control on internal server. The communication steps are as follows. 
Step 1: User A prepares the communication request including its own certificate. 
Step 2: User A sends the communication request message to User B. 
Step 3: User B checks User A’s certificate from the External CA and saves the 
certificate. 
Step 4: User B accepts the communication request including its own certificate. 
Step 5: User A checks User B’s certificate from the External CA and save the 
certificate. 
Step 6: User A requests the necessary domain parameters from server including its 
own certificate 
Step 7: Server checks User A’s certificate from External CA. 
Step 8: Server sends the necessary parameters to User A including its own certificate. 
Step 9: User A checks Servers certificate from stored certificate. 
Step 10:  User A generates the Public-Private Key pairs. 
Step 11: User A sends the required domain parameters and the Public Key to User B 
including its own certificate. 
Step 12: User B checks User A’s certificate from the stored certificate. 
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Figure 3.7. Authentication from CA with internal server by stored certificates 
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Step 13: User B takes the domain parameters and generates the public-private key 
pair. 
Step 14: User B computes session key. 
Step 15: User B sends its public key to User A including its own certificate. 
Step 16: User A checks User B’s certificate from the stored certificate. 
Step 17: User A computes the session key. 
 
If this scenario is employed in a company with unlimited internet access and 
sufficiently powerful hardware devices, the company should prefer to check the certificates in 
every transmission.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE 
 
Software has been implemented for the scenarios told in the thesis. There are two 
components in this software. One of them is a windows application and the other is a web 
service application for generating necessary parameters. Crympix crypto library is used for 
generation operations. A c to c# wrapper has been implemented and included in this software 
to obtain necessary functions and structures in Crympix.  
4.1. Protocol Implementation 
 
Making key exchange software is a little bit complicated. There are two sides 
communicating with each other. Both can decide on the key exchange protocol to use and 
both can generate domain parameters. There are many different variations in the system 
shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1. Variations of System 
 
 Each user can start the communication; the one who starts chooses the protocol for key 
exchange. Remote user is notified about the protocol and if he/she denies it, communication 
goes to the next step. 
 The next step is the generation of the domain parameters. Each user has an opportunity 
to generate domain parameters. Also users can send a job to the server and get the generated 
parameters. 
  All data transfers are in XML format in order to make this software adaptable with 
any other software. .Net platform has been chosen for this application but for mobile devices 
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especially, java applications can be written. So they can easily communicate with each other 
by XML structure. 
 Layered architecture is used in coding. So each operation has its own layer. This 
makes it easy to modify, update or fix the software. For example, all data are serialized in a 
specific layer and deserialization takes place in a remote machine in the same layer for the 
same data. In the case of XML structure change, only a change in the corresponding layer will 
be enough. 
4.2. Inheritance and Abstract Classes 
 
Key Exchange protocols have similar methods, such as 
o getParameters() 
o getPublicKey() 
o getPrivateKey() 
o getKey() 
o calculateDomainParameters() 
o calculateKeyPair() 
So in coding, an interface that is implemented by all key exchange protocols has been 
created. By this structure all protocols are the same objects for coders. If a private key is 
needed, there is no need to know the protocol that is selected. Only getPrivateKey() method is 
called and generated private key for the selected protocol is returned. 
For Diffie-Hellman Protocol a sample code is depicted in Figure 4.2. From the figure 
it’s apparent that a class can be implemented from the interface for connecting to another 
library. So any library can be used only by changing the protocol classes. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Sample Code of Protocol Methods 
 [DllImport("crympix.dll")] 
static extern int calculateDHDP(string p, string q);  
public void calculateDomainParameters() 
{ 
      try 
       { 
calculateDHDP(((DH)KeyCarrier.instance().cargo).modulN,  
((DH)KeyCarrier.instance().cargo).generatorG); 
       } 
       catch (Exception ex) 
       {    …        } 
} 
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These type of structures make applications easy to understand and easy for coding. 
Also upgrade by other people will be much simpler. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Class diagram of interface used in application 
  
Abstract classes are also used in application for grouping same variables of keys such 
as key length, and for implementing similar methods like getProtocolType() or 
getKeyValues(). Every key object in applications is carrying its protocol type as well. 
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Figure 4.4. Class diagram of keys in application 
 
A wrapper structure has been implemented like the structures in Crympix so that in .net 
applications one can get native dll structures of Crympix dll as .net objects. So upper levels of 
the software can easily get needed parameters from that object. Wrapper conversations can be 
seen in Figure 4.5 and in Figure 4.6 
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Figure 4.5 Crympix Diffie-Hellman Key Structure 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 .Net Diffie Hellman Key Structure 
 
4.3. XML and Web Services 
 
Server side is a very important point in this application because most domain 
parameters will be generated in server side. Therefore, there must be an application in server 
side for getting the requests and returning the required domain parameters to the users. 
   public class DH:KeyEx 
    { 
        private string m_generatorG; 
        private string m_modulN; 
        private string m_privateKey; 
        private string m_key; 
        private string m_publicKey; 
        private string m_remotesPublicKey; 
 
        public string remotesPublicKey {…} 
        public string publicKey {…} 
        public string generatorG {…} 
        public string modulN {…} 
        public string privateKey {…} 
        public string key {…} 
 
        public override KeyExchange.Business.Enums.ProtocolType getProtocolType() 
        { 
            return KeyExchange.Business.Enums.ProtocolType.DiffieHellman; 
        } 
        public override string getKeyValues() 
        { 
            … 
        } 
    } 
typedef struct{ 
 FP_t fp;  
 FP_t q;  
 MI_t g;  
 MI_t x;  
 MI_t X;  
 MI_t Y;  
 MI_t key;  
}DH_FP_t[1], *DH_FP; 
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XML Web services are the best solutions for this need. Because the future mobile 
devices with java applications can use this system for communication. XML will be the global 
language for these devices and all devices will use xml to send to or receive data from server. 
Client applications are communicating with XML also, so that any application written 
in any programming language by using XML can communicate with this application with 
specific parameters. 
Serialize and Deserialize methods are used for these operations. By serialize methods, 
application transforms objects to xml strings and makes it ready for transferring to other users. 
Deserialize methods get the xml strings and transform them into objects. 
4.4. Adaptation to other Libraries 
 
Application has been written in a layered architecture, the layers are shown in Figure 4.4. 
As told before, key exchange protocols are implementing IKeyExProtocol interface. So if 
another cryptographic library is chosen only new Key Exchange protocols must be written for 
calling those cryptographic libraries’ methods which implement IKeyExProtocol. 
 
User Interface
Keys Enums Bussiness Logic 
Operations
Communication 
Methods
Key Exchange Protocols
Cryptographic Library
 
 
Figure 4.7. Layers of the application 
 
 For each cryptographic library only three classes for each protocol must be written. 
These are DHProtocol, ECDHProtocol and MQVProtocol. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
CONCLUSION AND THE FUTURE WORK 
 
In the thesis many scenarios are explained. There are many possible algorithms and 
protocols for exchanging keys and to get a session key. However, as seen only implementing 
Key Exchange protocols is not enough. There can be some attacks. Therefore, in 
implementing a system, some security implementations and design must be done. 
In this thesis, the importance of the attacks is shown. If attacks are not blocked, the 
attacker can get all the communication data without the knowledge of the sender or receiver.  
In this thesis, a method is proposed to determine man in the middle attack, certification 
has the most important role in this operation. New generation mobile sim cards have users’ 
certification inside, which means it is easy to use this application in mobile environments.  
Application design is the other important point. By the layered design the application 
can be adapted to any cryptographic platform. This makes the application modular. 
5.1. Future Work 
 
Application has been implemented on .Net platform (www.microsoft.com 2008), for 
future work it can be developed in Java (java.sun.com 2008), Java Micro Edition 
(java.sun.com 2008) and .Net Compact Framework (msdn.microsoft.com 2008). By the 
improvements on mobile signatures and mobile hardware, mobile applications are getting 
more important so this application can be implemented in mobile frameworks for 
communicating mobile devices with others. 
Also key exchange for more than two people scenarios can be developed and an 
application can be implemented. Those scenarios are important for companies for 
communicating with their staff. 
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